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The EU’s Relations with Kosovo – Or Why We Should Still 
Value Brussels Bureaucracy 
 








Kosovo’s recent agreement with the EU is a milestone in its European relations, if 
not for the contents of the deal itself then for the sidestepping of disagreements 
over its legal status, explains Lorinc Redei. He argues that the European 
Commission’s success in managing the terms of the discussion on Kosovo serves as 
a testament to the continued influence of supranational actors in European 
integration. 
 
Last month, the European Union signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
with Kosovo. If this had happened with any other country, it would not be terribly 
interesting news. But five of the twenty-eight members of the EU do not recognise 
Kosovo as an independent state. Imagine a club entertaining the possibility of 
admitting someone whose very existence was denied by one-fifth of its 
membership. How did this come to pass? 
 
The answer is a decidedly unsexy one: the European Commission has over the past 
few years managed to technocratise – and therefore depoliticise – the issue of 
Kosovo’s status in relation to its accession to the EU. Through the use of various 
creative bureaucratic initiatives, it has defanged the politically sensitive question of 
Kosovo’s contested sovereignty, and kept its European integration process moving 
forward. The Commission has done this by introducing the ‘Kosovo*’ notation, 
creating the ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreement Dialogue’ and showing 
strategic patience until the Lisbon Treaty’s entry into force gave it international 
legal personality. 
 
Kosovo’s name has long been a hot-button political issue: until a few years ago, the 
Council insisted on using the formulation ‘Kosovo under UNSCR 1244’ in its 
documents, whereas the European Parliament (a cheerleader for Kosovo’s 
independence) has used simply ‘Kosovo’ since 2006. The Commission, caught in the 
middle, has tried to placate both fervent supporters and opponents of Kosovo’s 
sovereignty. 
 
In its documents meant for external audiences, it uses the term ‘Kosovo*’—using 
the asterisk to relegate the controversy surrounding its status to a footnote, which 
reads ‘this designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with 
UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence.’ The 
politically divisive question of sovereignty is thus swept under the rug, allowing 
substantive issues to be considered in its absence.  
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A similar instance of creative verbal gymnastics accompanied the Commission’s 
continuous dialogue with authorities in Kosovo. Over the years, the Commission had 
launched Stabilisation and Association Processes (SAPs) with all the potential EU 
candidate countries in the Western Balkans – helping to harmonise their legislation 
with EU rules and regulations. 
 
Kosovo’s status precluded it from its own SAP but, from 2002, the Commission had 
established the so-called ‘Stabilisation and Association Process Tracking 
Mechanism’, mimicking the SAPs it had entered into with Kosovo’s neighbours, and 
tacking on two extra words. In 2009, this process was renamed the ‘Stabilisation 
and Association Process Dialogue’, reducing the semantic differences and further 
aligning the process with the Commission’s relations with other potential EU 
candidates in the Western Balkans. 
 
The Commission was clear that these inventions were simply meant to give 
different names to the same substantive processes it was pursuing with other 
candidate countries. In fact, the creation of such parallel instruments is called 
‘mirroring’ by the Commission staff responsible for it. 
 
Finally, the Commission was able to use strategic patience by maintaining the 
accession process until changes in the Treaty of Lisbon allowed it to take on a more 
active role – essentially waiting out recalcitrant Member States. Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements (SAAs) had required ratification by EU Member States, until 
the Lisbon Treaty conferred legal personality on the EU, allowing the Commission to 
sign international agreements. 
 
It therefore waited until it could draft an SAA that excluded any provisions that still 
fell under the national competence of Member States, and thus only concerned 
areas in which the Commission had exclusive competence. It was then free to initial 
it (in July 2014) and sign it (27 October 2015), bypassing the need for Member State 
ratification. 
  
For those of us in academia, it is worth noting that these creative work-arounds are 
tricks of the trade we all ply: burying controversies in footnotes, renaming existing 
concepts to circumvent objections to how we use them and waiting on submitting 
ideas until they become actionable in a policy setting – we are all familiar with 
these strategies. 
 
More importantly, however, this series of bureaucratic ways to depoliticise Kosovo’s 
accession process show that the original ideas of the EU’s founding fathers are alive 
and well. Despite the recent academic literature on the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ 
or ideas of ‘European disintegration,’ it seems that the notions of Robert Schuman 
and Jean Monnet still work today. 
 
Politically thorny issues can sometimes be settled by channelling political debates 
into supranational institutions that aim to resolve them through technocratic 
means. This can, in turn, benefit everyone – even those national governments 
which are at the root of the political controversies in the first place. 
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None of this is to say that Kosovo’s accession to the EU is anywhere close to being 
realised. After all, membership requires ratification by all current Member States. 
Kosovo itself is far from achieving the political and economic criteria needed for 
joining, and it is unlikely that the EU will be willing to take in new members for a 
long while. Yet the signature of the SAA does suggest that the unpopular, faceless 
Brussels bureaucrats of the Berlaymont may be much more adept at pushing the 
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